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By James Sillars, Business Reporter. Fill 2 Copy 11 Created with Sketch. Wednesday 1 February , UK. Why you can trust Sky News. Devolution of this power to the Scottish Parliament will be enacted through the UK parliament in due course.
Page 11 of the report states: "The UK government has undertaken to produce draft clauses implementing" In the Department for Social Development said that only a judge could rule on their legality. A betting review in the Republic of Ireland ruled that the machines should not be introduced in Irish betting shops but would be allowed in casinos. It is claimed FOBTs are used for money laundering by paying cash into the terminal, making low-risk bets which involve a small relative loss, and withdrawing most of the proceeds as a voucher which is exchanged for cash at the shop counter.
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They have made Cuba a victim of foreign imperialism, an instrument of the policy of others. This, and this alone, divides us. Thus, when speculation arose as to the possibility of conspiracy, Fidel Castro and his Communist government were natural suspects. While rationality may have precluded any involvement of the Cuban Government, the recognition that Castro had been among the late President's most prominent enemies compelled such speculation.
To them, it was another betrayal see section C 3 for details. The report of the Warren Commission reflects that it was indeed considered, especially with respect to the implications of Oswald's Mexico City trip. Nevertheless, beginning with a column by Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson, press reports that suggested Castro's involvement in the assassination began to circulate once again.
Top of Page 2 The U. Senate investigation. Sheffield Edwards. According to the Senate committee, this operation lasted until February Castro probably would not have been certain that the CIA was behind the underworld attempts. The task force first considered the retaliation thesis. It advanced the position that the Senate committee had essentially ignored the history of adversarial relations between the United States and Cuba which, if provocation were the issue, provided adequate grounds to support a theory of possible retaliation without the necessity of reaching for specific Agency programs such as the Mafia and AMLASH plots.
Were he a provocateur reporting to Castro, or if he was merely careless and leaked what he knew, he had no factual basis for leaking or reporting any actual CIA plot directed against Castro. A conclusion of the Senate committee had been that further investigation was warranted, based in part on its finding that the CIA had responded inadequately to the Warren Commission's request for all possible relevant information.
The CIA had not told the Commission of the plots. CIA, too, could have considered in specific terms what most saw in general terms-- the possibility of Soviet or Cuban involvement in the JFK Page assassination because of the tensions of the time The Agency should have taken broader initiatives, then, as well.
That CIA employees at the time felt--as they obviously did-- that the activities about which they knew had no relevance to the Warren Commission inquiry does not take the place of a record of conscious review. The Warren Commission had expressed its view, as follows The Warren Commission's investigation, limited as it was, simply did not find a conspiracy. Although the Commission inferred that the first interpretation was the proper one, the committee investigated the possibility that the second was closer to the truth.
Similarly, the committee investigated to see if there was a factual basis for a finding made by the Senate Select Committee that the CIA plots to assassinate Castro could have given rise to crucial leads that could have been pursued in and , or, at a minimum, would have provided critical additional impetus to the Commission's investigation.
It did, however, enumerate four areas for review of its performance: Oswald's travel to and from the U. They would only have served to head off outside criticism. That conclusion is illustrated in the following passage of the report However, it must be recognized that CIA cannot be as confident of a cold trail in as it could have been in ; this apparent fact will be noted by the critics of the Agency, and by those who have found a career in the questions already asked and yet to be asked about the assassination of President Kennedy.
But the report failed to document that fact, if it were a fact. For example, it provided no detailed resume of the backgrounds of those CIA case officers, Cubans and Mafia figures who plotted together to kill Castro. There is nothing in the report on the activities of the anti-Castro plotters during the last half of If the Agency had been truly interested in determining the possible investigative significance to the Kennedy assassination of such CIA-Cuban-Mafia associations, the committee assumed it would have directed its immediate attention to such activities in that period.
The task force report also noted that even without its taking broader initiatives, the CIA still sent general directives to overseas stations and cited, as an example, a cable which read: Tragic death of President Kennedy requires all of us to look sharp for any unusual intelligence development.
Although we have no reason to expect anything of a particular military nature, all hands should be on the quick alert for the next few days while the new President takes over the reins. The task force argued, in any event, that such general requirements for intelligence-gathering would have been adequate, since "relevant information on the subject" would have been reported anyway. While the Florida station was mentioned, the task force report failed to make a comprehensive analysis of what requirements were placed on the station and the station's response.
It might have been expected that the station would have been required to contact and debrief all of its Cuban sources. In addition, the station should have been asked to use all of its possible sources to determine if any operatives in the anti-Castro Cuban community had information about possible Cuban Government involvement or about any association between Oswald and possible Cuban Government agents. Further, the station, or possibly other units of the CIA, should have been tasked to attempt to reconstruct the details of the travels and activities of known pro-Castro Cuban operatives in the United States for 60 or 90 days prior to the assassination.
Such undertakings might have been made without specific cables or memoranda requiring them. The Task Force Report implied such efforts were taken by the stations "on their own initiative. The committee found that the CIA's Task Force Report was little more than an attempted rebuttal of the Senate Select Committee's criticisms, and not a responsible effort to evaluate objectively its own investigation or its anti-Castro activities during the early 's or to assess their significance vis-a-vis the assassination.
The committee made an effort to evaluate these questions through its own independent investigation. In investigating the implications of the CIA plots and the Warren Commission's ignorance of them, the committee conducted interviews, depositions and hearings for the purpose of taking testimony from pertinent individuals, conducted interviews in Mexico and Cuba, and reviewed extensive files at the CIA and FBI. Helms, in his testimony before the committee, stated that the AMLASH operation was not designed to be an assassination plot.
The committee found that the evidence confirmed the Senate committee's report that AMLASH himself envisioned assassination as an essential first step in any overthrow of Castro. That relationship could also have been viewed by Castro as one involving the CIA in his planned assassination.
Government would back him in the event his coup was successful. On this point, the committee was unable to accept or reject the Cuban Government's claim with confidence. The committee merely noted that the statement was corroborated by other information known about the dates of Cubela's arrest and trial in Cuba and the charges against him. The Cuban Government's position must, however, be recognized as potentially self-serving, since it must be assumed the Cuban Government would be inclined not to reveal any knowledge it may have had about AMLASH's assassination plans and the CIA prior to November 22, If it had indicated it knew, it would have contributed to the credibility of the Senate's theories about possible Cuban involvement in the assassination as a retaliatory act.
He confirmed the statements of the Cuban Government to the committee 90 that he did not give the Cuban Government any information that would have led it to believe that the CIA was involved in a plot on Castro's life in In considering Cubela's testimony, the committee took into account the possible influence of his confinement.
After reviewing all the available evidence, the committee concluded that Castro may well have known about the AMLASH plot by November 22, , and, if so, he could have either documented or assumed it was backed by the United States and that it was directed at his life.
The committee believed that the details of the AMLASH operation should have been provided to the Warren Commission, since the Commission might have been able to develop leads to participants in the Kennedy assassination. At a minimum, the existence of the plot, if it had been brought to the Commissions attention, would have served as a stimulus in the investigation. In conclusion, the committee believed a description of the activities of participants in the AMLASH plot should have been provided to the Warren Commission.
It based this not only on the possibility that the plots could have increased Castro's motivation to conspire to assassinate President Kennedy assuming he, in fact, was privy to the plot prior to November 22, , but also because knowledge of the AMLASH plot might have increased the interest of the CIA, FBI, and Warren Commission in a more thorough investigation of the question of Cuban conspiracy.
The committee noted however, that to the extent that that thesis was true, it did not negate the conclusion that the AMLASH plot was relevant Page and that information about it should have been supplied to the Warren Commission. If it had been made available, it might have affected the course of the investigation. He had installed a telephone wiretap, which he claimed was done as a favor to Mafia chieftain Sam Giancana, who was also involved in the anti-Castro plots.
The CIA corroborated Maheu's story, and the case was not prosecuted. Mor- Page gan; its ultimate source was Roselli. The committee determined from CIA files that, in , the Cuban Government had agents of its own in nearly every country of the Western Hemisphere, including the United States, who undoubtedly would have been more dependable for such an assignment.
Even if Castro had wanted to minimize the chance of detection by using hired non-Cuban killers, it appeared unlikely to the committee that he would have tried to force Mafia members or their Cuban exile confederates to engage in the assassination of an American head of state. The committee found it more difficult to dismiss the possibility that the Mafia, while it was not turned around by Castro, might have voluntarily turned around with him. By late and , when the underworld leaders involved with the CIA in the plots had perhaps lost their motivation to assassinate Castro, they had been given sufficient reason by the organized crime program of the Department of Justice to eliminate President Kennedy.
The committee's investigation revealed that Mafia figures are rational, pragmatic "businessmen" who often realine their associations and form partnerships with ex-enemies when it is expedient. By also, Cuban exiles bitterly opposed to Castro were being frustrated by the Kennedy administration.
President was an obstacle requiring elimination even more urgently than the Cuban dictator. The committee found that the CIA-Mafia-Cuban plots had all the elements necessary for a successful assassination conspiracy--people, motive and means, and the evidence indicated that the participants might well have considered using the resources at their disposal to increase their power and alleviate their problems by assassinating the President. Nevertheless, the committee was ultimately frustrated in its attempt to determine details of those activities that might have led to the assassination--identification of participants, associations, timing of events and so on.
Many of the key figures of the Castro plots had, for example, since died or, as in the case of both Giancana and Roselli, had been murdered. The committee was also unable to confirm in its investigation the findings of the Senate committee and the CIA that there were reasons to discount the dangers to President Kennedy that may have resulted from CIA associations with the Mafia in anti-Castro activities, The Page committee did not agree with the Senate committee that Castro would not have blamed President Kennedy for the CIA-Mafia plots against his life.
They were formulated in the United States, and the history of United States-Cuban relations shows that when Castro erred in his assumptions, it was in the direction of attributing more, not less, responsibility for attempts to depose him to U. Government actions than might have been merited. In its Task Force Report, the CIA commented on this reality: The United States provided a haven and base for Cuban exiles, who conducted their independent operations against the Castro government.
Some of these exiles had the support of CIA, as well as from other elements of the U. Government, and still others had support from private sources. With or without official U. The Cuban intelligence services had agents in the exile community in America and it is likely that what they reported back to Havana assigned to CIA responsibility for many of the activities under consideration, whether CIA was involved or not.
At that time, it might still have been possible to determine precise dates of trips, meetings, telephone communications: and financial transactions, and the participants in these potentially pertinent transactions could have been questioned. At least in this one respect, the committee must concur with a sentiment expressed in the CIA Task Force Report: Today, the knowledge of the persons involved directly in the various Cuban operations in the period preceding President Kennedy's death cannot be recaptured in the form that it existed then.
These persons are scattered, their memories are blurred by time, and some are dead. The record is clear that the relationships created by the plots did not terminate, nor had the threat to Castro abated by that time. There is insufficient evidence to conclude that the inherently sinister relationships had become benign by November 22, Office of Security, as late as The plots, in short, should have been made known to the Warren Commission.
If they had been investigated in , they might have provided insights into what happened in Dallas and resolved questions that have persisted. Top of Page 3 Summary of the evidence --By its conclusions about the AMLASH operation and the CIA-Mafia plots--that they were of possible consequence to the assassination investigation and therefore should have been revealed to the Warren Commission--the committee did not intend to imply it had discovered a link to the assassination.
To the contrary, the committee was not able to develop evidence that President Kennedy was murdered in retaliation for U. On the other hand, the possibility that President Kennedy was assassinated in retaliation for anti-Castro activities of the CIA should have been considered quite pertinent, especially in light of specific allegations of conspiracy possibly involving supporters of the Cuban leader.
Top of Page d Cubana Airlines flight allegation The committee considered specific allegations of conspiracy involving supporters of Castro. One such charge, referred to in book V of the Senate select committee's report, concerns a Cubana Airlines flight from Mexico City to Havana on the evening of November 23, This committee checked the times of key events that night by reviewing extensive investigative agency documents.
It found the following facts: The Cubana flight was on the ground in Mexico City for a total of only about 4 hours and 10 minutes and thus could not have been delayed five hours. Top of Page e Gilberto Policarpo Lopez allegation More troubling to the committee was another specific allegation discussed by the Senate committee.
The message added that Lopez had obtained tourist card No. It noted, too: "Source states the timing and circumstances surrounding subject's travel through Mexico and departure for Havana are suspicious. A copy of the photograph with "27 November " stamped on the back was found in his CIA file by committee investigators in Citizen" by an operations officer of the responsible component of the agency.
In the review, the file was classified as a "counterintelligence case, that is, involving a foreign intelligence or security service. He returned to the United States in or fearing he would be drafted into the Cuban militia. She listed companies where he had been employed, including a construction firm in Tampa. She also said he began suffering from epileptic attacks, was confined for a time at Jackson Memorial Hospital in Miami in early , and was treated by doctors in Coral Gables and Key West.
She said she believed the epilepsy was brought on by concern for his family in Cuba. She said she had been surprised, although he had mentioned returning, to Cuba before he left for Tampa in November In a later letter, Lopez told his wife he had received financial assistance for his trip to Cuba from an organization in Tampa.
His wife explained that he would not have been able to pay for the trip without help. She said, however, he had not had earlier contacts with Cuban refugee organizations. In its Task Force Report, the CIA cited the several "inaccuracies," as they had been repeated in the report of the Senate Select Committee, as reason to refute the report itself. The TFR pointed out that Lopez' name had been misspelled "Lopes," that it had Lopez entering Mexico on foot, when the CIA had information that he had traveled by automobile; that it listed incorrect digits for Lopez' passport number; that it stated that Lopez' Mexican tourist visa had been issued in Nuevo Laredo, not Tampa; and it reported that he had stayed at the Cuban Embassy.
Based on these inaccuracies, the TFR concluded, "the source was patently and extensively misinformed. Page Rodriguez said Lopez left Key West in late for Tampa with the hope of being able to return to Cuba, explaining he was afraid he would be drafted into the U. Rodriguez said Lopez had not been involved in pro-Castro activity in Key West, but that he was definitely pro-Castro, and he had once gotten into a fistfight over his Castro sympathies.
In a March report, it recounted that at a November 17 meeting of the Tampa FPCC, Lopez had said he had not been granted permission to return to Cuba but that he was awaiting a phone call about his return to his homeland. His Mexican tourist card was numbered M and was issued November 20, in Tampa.
The report also confirmed that Lopez entered Mexico via Laredo, Tex. He was carrying a Cuban courtesy visa. Dated October 26, , it read: It is felt that information developed regarding the subject is not sufficient to merit consideration for the Security Index. It claimed that the agency had carried its investigation of Lopez as far as it could, having questioned a Cuban defector about him.
Attempts in the Task Force Report to denigrate the information that was provided on Lopez were not an adequate substitute for enabling the Warren Commission itself to pursue the leads more aggressively. Page From the information gathered by the FBI, there appeared to be plausible reasons both for Lopez' desire to return to Cuba and for his solicitation of financial aid from the Tampa FPCC chapter. Lopez' contacts in Florida appeared to have been innocent and not connected with the assassination, and while there was a suggestion in the Senate committee's report that Lee Harvey Oswald also was in contact with the Tampa FPCC chapter, the committee could find no evidence of it.
Nor could the committee find any evidence that Oswald was in contact with Lopez. Lopez' association with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, however, coupled with the facts that the dates of his travel to Mexico via Texas coincide with the assassination, plus the reports in Mexico that Lopez' activities were "suspicious," all amount to a troublesome circumstance that the committee was unable to resolve with confidence. Top of Page f Other allegations The committee also pursued allegations of Cuban complicity that were not suggested by the investigation of the Senate committee.
For example, it looked into an allegation by one Autulio Ramirez Ortiz, who hijacked an aircraft to Cuba in Ramirez claimed that while being held by the Cuban Government, he worked in an intelligence facility where he found a dossier on Lee Harvey Oswald. The KGB has recommended this individual He is a North American, married to an agent of the Soviet organism who has orders to go and reside in the United States.
Oswald is an adventurer. Our Embassy in Mexico has orders to get in contact with him. Be very careful. On the other hand, in every instance where there was independent evidence of allegations made by Ramirez the identities of Cuban officials named by him, for example Ramirez' statements were found to be accurate. The decisive factor was the committee's belief that the Cuban intelligence system in the period was too sophisticated to have been infiltrated by Ramirez in the manner he had described.
While some details of his story could be corroborated, the essential aspects of his allegation were incredible. The committee also considered the allegation that appeared in an article in a issue of the National Enquirer, written by a British freelancer named Comer Clark. Castro denied there had ever been an interview with Clark. Nothing in the evidence indicated that the threat should have been taken seriously, if it had occurred, since Oswald had behaved in an argumentative and obnoxious fashion during his visit to the consulate.
The accuracy of Clark's account was also undermined by the committee's investigation of his background. A highly confidential but reliable source reported that Oswald had indeed vowed in the presence of Cuban consulate officials to assassinate the President. The files that were reviewed included records of conversations of relevant people at appropriate times and places. Only one of them provided any possible corroboration. It was the record of a reported conversation by an employee of the Cuban Embassy named Luisa Calderon.
A blind memorandum 12 provided by the CIA to the committee contained Calderon's pertinent remarks: 1. A reliable source reported that on November 22, , several hours after the assassination of President John F. Initially, when asked if she had heard the latest news, Calderon replied, in what appeared to be a joking manner, "Yes, of course, I knew almost before Kennedy. After further discussion of the news accounts about the assassination, the acquaintance asked Calderon what else she had learned.
Calderon replied that they [assumed to refer to personnel of the Cuban Embassy] learned about it a little while ago. Page Luisa Calderon's statements on the day of the assassination could be construed as either an indication of foreknowledge or mere braggadocio. The preponderance of the evidence led the committee to find that it was braggadocio.
While the committee attempted to interview Calderon in Cuba, it was unable to, since she was ill. The committee also made a judgment about the risk that would have been incurred by Cubans had they testified falsely on this issue or by those who might have orchestrated their false testimony. Based on newspaper reporting alone, the Cuban Government might reasonably have believed that the committee had access to extensive information about conversations in the Cuban consulate in Mexico City and that such information might have provided convincing evidence of a coverup.
To have been caught in a lie in public testimony in the United States 13 would have been a major embarrassment for the Cuban Government, one that might have implied more than moral responsibility for failing to report a threat against President Kennedy in advance of the assassination.
On balance, the committee did not believe that Oswald voiced a threat to Cuban officials. However reliable the confidential source may be, the committee found it to be in error in this instance. The committee investigated other aspects of Oswald's trip to Mexico City in September to see if it could develop information that bore on the question of a Cuban conspiracy.
It considered the claim by the Cuban consul in Mexico City in , Eusebio Azcue, that a man posing as Oswald applied for a Cuban visa. Page sion did not investigate, lay in her description of one of the companions as gaunt and blond-haired. Even in the late 's, at a time when Garro and others were available for questioning, there was still the potential for sufficient corroboration 16 to make the allegation worth pursuing.
Further, while the allegation did not specifically show a Cuban conspiracy, it did indicate significant Oswald associations that were not known to the Warren Commission. The other Oswald association in Mexico City that might have proven significant, had it been pursued, was the one alleged by Oscar Contreras, a student at the National Autonomous University of Mexico. The committee made an effort to investigate this allegation.
Silvia Duran, for example, admitted to the committee. A review of the CIA file indicated that the allegation was treated skeptically because Agency officials apparently considered Elena Garro to be other than totally rational.
Inquiries of sources were ordered, but the files do not indicate that any responses were actively solicited or, in fact, received. The Agency files on this aspect of the case are devoid of any substance that would suggest an active CIA investigation. The committee did ultimately locate Elena Garro in Europe, but attempts by telephone to persuade her to come to the United States to testify did not succeed Elena Garro, alleged that Calvillo placed her in the Hotel Vermont in Mexico City where she remained for several days.
Page tember following a roundtable discussion at the school of philosophy. On two occasions, the Mexican Government said he would be available for an interview, but neither materialized. The committee also was unable to contract Guerra. The committee also pondered what deductions might be drawn from Azcue's conviction that the man who applied for a Cuban visa was not Oswald.
One possibility considered, although ultimately rejected by the committee, was that there was a sinister association between Oswald and the Castro regime that Azcue was attempting to conceal. The committee weighed the evidence on both sides of the Oswald-at-the-Cuban-consulate issue: That it was Oswald was indicated by the testimony of Silvia Duran and Alfredo Mirabal, who was in the process of succeeding Azcue as Cuban consul when the visit occurred in late September They both identified Oswald from post-assassination photographs as the man who applied for a Cuban visa.
That it was not Oswald was a possibility raised by the committee's inability to secure a photograph of him entering or leaving the Soviet Embassy or the Cuban consulate. The committee obtained evidence from the Cuban Government that such photographs were being taken routinely in Further, the committee found that Oswald paid at least five visits to the Soviet Embassy or the Cuban consulate. In April , for example, when the President and Mrs.
Kennedy were scheduled to address a special meeting of the Council of the Organization of American States, the State Department reported that Cuba would be represented by one Quentin Pino Machado. Machado, a Cuban diplomat, described as a character of ill repute, armed and dangerous, ultimately did not attend the meeting. There were 17 The Contreras story, as in the case of the Elena Garro allegation, was not adequately pursued when it first came to the attention of the CIA in At that time, the Agency was informed by the U.
Consul in Tampico, Mexico, that Contreras had passed the information to him. An Agency employee later discussed the matter in more detail with the Consul and then met with Contreras himself. The Contreras story was considered, according to Agency files, to be the first significant development in the investigation of the Kennedy assassination after Nevertheless, no attempt was made to determine who Contreras' associates were or how Oswald might have contacted him. Instead, the case was simply reported to the FBI.
According to FBI files, no follow-up investigation was conducted. The committee did obtain a photograph of a man whose description seemed to match that given by Azcue and Duran of the "gaunt and blond-haired" visitor to the Cuban consulate. They each stated, however, that he was not the man they had described as the one who, in the name of Lee Harvey Oswald, had applied for a visa to Cuba.
Page rumors in the Miami Cuban community at the time that Machado had been assigned to escort Oswald from Texas to Cuba after the assassination. The plan went awry, the report continued, because Oswald had not been wearing clothing of a prearranged color and because of the shooting of Dallas Patrolman J.
The committee could find no record of follow-up action. It sought information on numerous allegations, such as those mentioned above, and it put to President Castro the question of Cuban involvement in the assassination. The committee found the Cuban Government to be cooperative, both in supplying written reports and documents in response to questions and by making a number of its citizens available for interviews.
From the ideological point of view it was insane. And from the political point of view, it was a tremendous insanity. I am going to tell you here that nobody, nobody ever had the idea of such things. What would it do? We just tried to defend our folks here, within our territory. Anyone who subscribed to that idea would have been judged insane Never, in 20 years of revolution, I never heard anyone suggest nor even speculate about a measure of that sort, because who could think of the idea of organizing the death of the President of the United States.
That would have been the most perfect pretext for the United States to invade our country. Since the United States is much more powerful than we are, what could we gain from a war with the United States? The United States would lose nothing. The destruction would have been here. It has never done that. I did not mean even that And, if at present, the same would happen under the same circumstances, I would have no doubt in saying the same as I said [then] because I didn't mean a threat by that.
I didn't say it as a threat. I did not mean by that that we were going to take measures--similar measures-- like a retaliation for that. We never meant that because we knew that there were plots. For 3 years, we had known there were plots against us.
So the conversation came about very casually, you know; but I would say that all these plots or attempts were part of the everyday life. Instead, it would have been to his advantage, Castro insisted, to have pursued the prospect for better relations that had been portended. What the committee was able to do 15 years later could fill in important details, but it could not make up for basic insufficiencies.
Unfortunately, the committee found that there were in fact significant deficiencies in the earlier investigation. The Warren Commission knew far less than it professed to know about Oswald's trip to Mexico and his possible association with pro-Castro agents in Mexico and elsewhere. It must be said that the FBI generally exhausted its resources in confirming the case against Lee Harvey Oswald as the lone assassin, a case that Director J. Edgar Hoover, at least, seemed determined to make within 24 hours of the assassination.
The committee found that such initiatives could have included more comprehensive instructions on debriefing Cuban sources and more explicit tasking of stations for specific investigative efforts. With respect to the CIA's investigation of possible Cuban complicity, however, the committee found that the Agency's shortcomings were not attributable to any improper motive.
The committee found that the CIA did generally gather and analyze the information that came to its attention regarding possible Cuban involvement, at least until the Warren Commission made its report in Indeed, the committee noted that the Agency acted not only out of dedication, but out of a specific motivation related to Cuba. The officers, agents and employees in the Cuba-related divisions had devoted their careers to the overthrow of Castro, and evidence of his participation in the assassination, if it had existed and could have been brought to light, would have vindicated their long-frustrated efforts, of not, in fact, led directly to a U.
That being said, the committee did not ignore the possibility that certain CIA officials who were aware that close scrutiny of U. The committee determined, however, that only CIA Deputy Director Richard Helms would have been in a position to have had both the requisite knowledge and the power to accomplish such a coverup, and it was satisfied, on the basis of its investigation, that it was highly unlikely he in fact did so.
C 3 , the CIA had developed since the ability to identify from physical descriptions possible intelligence agents who may have been involved. In fact, at the committee's request, the CIA attempted to identify Odio's visitors, and it determined that they may have been members of Cuban intelligence. It is also regrettable that the CIA did not make use of a defector from Cuba who had worked in intelligence and who might have been able to identify the Odio visitors.
The Agency had, for example, comprehensive coverage of anti-Castro Cuban groups that, in turn, had extensive information sources in and out of Cuba. That investigation found no evidence of Cuban complicity. Top of Page i Summary of the findings While the committee did not take Castro's denials at face value, it found persuasive reasons to conclude that the Cuban Government was not involved in the Kennedy assassination.
First, by there were prospects for repairing the hostility that had marked relations between the two countries since Castro had come to power. Second, the risk of retaliation that Cuba would have incurred by conspiring in the assassination of an American President must have canceled out other considerations that might have argued for that act. President Castro's description of the idea as "insane" is appropriate. And there was no evidence indicating an insane or grossly reckless lack of judgment on the part of the Cuban Government.
Third, the CIA had both the motive to develop evidence of Cuban involvement and access to at least substantial, if incomplete, information bearing on relevant aspects of it, had such involvement existed. Its absence, therefore, must be weighed in the balance. Finally, the Cuban Government's cooperation with this committee in the investigation must be a factor in any judgment.
In conclusion, the committee found, on the basis of the evidence available to it, that the Cuban Government was not involved in the assassination of President Kennedy. Top of Page 3. Echevarria Antonio Veciana Blanch Silvia Odio Oswald and the anti-Castro Cubans Oswald in New Orleans Oswald in Clinton, La David Ferrie Camp Street A committee analysis of Oswald in New Orleans Summary of the evidence The committee investigated possible involvement in the assassination by a number of anti-Castro Cuban groups and individual activists for two primary reasons: First, they had the motive, based on what they considered President Kennedy's betrayal of their cause, the liberation of Cuba from the Castro regime; the means, since they were trained and practiced in violent acts, the result of the guerrilla warfare they were waging against Castro; and the opportunity, whenever the President, as he did from time to time, appeared at public gatherings, as in Dallas on November 22, Second, the committee's investigation revealed that certain associations of Lee Harvey Oswald were or may have been with anti-Castro activists.
The committee, therefore, paid close attention to the activities of anti-Castro Cubans--in Miami, where most of them were concentrated and their organizations were headquartered, 1 and in New Orleans Page and Dallas, where Oswald, while living in these cities in the months preceding the assassination, reportedly was in contact with anti-Castro activists.
From the evidence that was available in , two Warren Commission staff attorneys, W. David Slawson and William Coleman, went so far as to speculate that Oswald, despite his public posture as a Castro sympathizer, might actually have been an agent of anti-Castro exiles. He made no secret of his sympathies, so the anti-Castro Cubans must have realized that law enforcement authorities were also aware of Oswald's feelings and that, therefore, if he got into trouble, the public would also learn of them Second, someone in the anti-Castro organization might have been keen enough to sense that Oswald had a penchant for violence On these facts, it is possible that some sort of deception was used to encourage Oswald to kill the President when he came to Dallas The motive of this would, of course, be the expectation that after the President was killed, Oswald would be caught or at least his identity ascertained, the law enforcement authorities and the public would blame the assassination on the Castro government, and a call for its forceful overthrow would be irresistible It is appropriate to begin that consideration with an examination of the history of United States-Cuban relations from the perspective of the anti-Castro movement, beginning with the victorious end of the revolution on January 1, Government was responsive to the efforts of exiles to remove a Communist threat from the Caribbean, only 90 miles from the Page Florida coast, and to recapture business investments lost to the nationalization of industry in Cuba.
The Cuban exiles, dependent on the United States for arms and logistical support, had little choice but to put their trust in Washington. Kennedy with anything," Varona testified. Nevertheless, President Kennedy told us he was the one--the only one responsible. Kennedy told the truth when he publicly accepted responsibility The heroism of the beleaguered Cuban Brigade had been rewarded by betrayal, defeat, death for many of them, long and cruel imprisonment for the rest.
The Cuban people Far from abandoning the Cuban exiles, he set out to convince them of his loyalty to their cause. One of the most emotionally charged events of his relationship with the Cuban exiles occurred on December 29, , at the Orange Bowl in Miami. The euphoria was false and misleading. Although the Cuban exiles cheered President Kennedy that day, there also coursed through the crowd a bitter resentment among some who felt they were witnessing a display of political hypocrisy.
Later, it would be claimed that the brigade feeling against President Kennedy was so strong that the presentation nearly did not take place, and it would be alleged incorrectly, as it turned out that the brigade flag given to Kennedy was actually a replica. From the exiles' perspective, however, they had been compromised, since as part of the bargain, President Kennedy made a pledge not to invade Cuba. Their bitterness is illustrated in a tape recording of a meeting of anti-Castro Cubans and right-wing Americans in the Dallas suburb of Farmer's Branch on October 1, Government's policy of "non-interference" with respect to the Cuban issue.
We're going to see him in one way or the other. We're going to give him the works when he gets in Dallas. I wouldn't even call him President Kennedy He stinks. The fine point of signing the pledge was of little importance to the Cuban exiles, however, who could point out later that no invasion did, in fact, occur. Are you insinuating that since this downfall came through the leader there [Castro in Cuba], that this might come to us? Yes ma'am, your present leader. He's the one who is doing everything right now to help the United States to become Communist.
The groups that received the committee's attention were "action groups"--those most involved in military actions and propaganda campaigns. Unlike most others, they did not merely talk about anti-Castro operations, they actually carried out infiltrations into Cuba, planned, and sometimes attempted, Castro's assassination, and shipped arms into Cuba. These were also the groups whose leaders felt most betrayed by U. Top of Page 1 Homer S. Nevertheless, it was unable to conclude with certainty that all of the threats were benign.
For example, one that the committee found particularly disturbing especially so, since it was not thoroughly looked into in the investigation came to the attention of the Secret Service within days of the President's death, prompting the Acting Special Agent-in-Charge of the Chicago field office to write an urgent memorandum indicating he had received reliable information of "a group in the Chicago area who [sic] may have a connection with the J.
His speech is quoted to illustrate the depth of feeling that existed in the Cuban exile community in Page had "plenty of money" and that his backers would proceed "as soon as we take care of Kennedy. Secret Service," 48 and that the Cuban group in question was probably not involved in illegal activities.
Unless an association with the President's assassin could be established, it is doubtful that it could be shown that the anti-Castro groups were involved in the assassination. The Warren Commission, discounting the recommendations of Slawson and Coleman, had either regarded these contacts as insignificant or as probably not having been made or else was not aware of them.
The Echevarria allegation is also discussed in section I D 1 b infra. It conducted numerous file reviews and interviews with associates and former associates of Veciana, to try to confirm the existence of a Maurice Bishop or otherwise assess Veciana's credibility. On a trip to Cuba, the committee interviewed Veciana's relative, the Cuban intelligence agent. While the committee was unable to find corroboration for the contacts with Bishop, it did substantiate other statements by Veciana.
For example, he did organize an attempted assassination of Castro in Havana in , 70 and he probably did participate in another plot against Castro in Chile in It reviewed CIA files, but they showed no record of such an agent or employee. It circulated a sketch via the national news media, but no one responded with an identification. It found several reasons to believe that Veciana had been less than candid: 23 The committee suspected that Veciana was lying when he denied that the retired CIA officer was Bishop.
The committee recognized that Veciana had an interest in renewing his anti-Castro operations that might have led him to protect the officer from exposure as Bishop so they could work together again. For his part, the retired officer aroused the committee's suspicion when he told the committee he did not recognize Veciana as the founder of Alpha 66, especially since the officer had once been deeply involved in Agency anti-Castro operations.
The committee also interviewed a former assistant of the retired officer but he could not recall his former superior ever having used the name or having been referred to as Bishop. The committee established that the CIA assigned case officers to Cuban revolutionaries of less importance than Veciana, though it could not draw from that alone an inference of CIA deception of the committee concerning Veciana, since Bishop could well have been in the employ of one of the military intelligence agencies or even perhaps of some foreign power.
Page First, Veciana waited more than 10 years after the assassination to reveal his story. Third, Veciana could not point to a single witness to his meetings with Bishop, much less with Oswald. Fourth, Veciana did little to help the committee identify Bishop. In the absence of corroboration or independent substantiation, the committee could not, therefore, credit Veciana's story of having met with Lee Harvey Oswald. Top of Page 3 Silvia Odio. Odio had not volunteered her information to the FBI.
Odio after hearing of a conversation she had had with her neighbor in which she described an encounter with Lee Harvey Oswald. Odio stated that the men told her that they had just come from New Orleans and that they were then about to leave on a trip. Odio claimed the American was Lee Harvey Oswald.
Odio's sister, who was in the apartment at the time of the visit by the three men and who stated that she saw them briefly in the hallway when answering the door, also believed that the American was Lee Harvey Oswald. Odio fixed the date of the alleged visit as being September 26 or In the summer of , the FBI was pressed to dig more deeply into the Odio allegation. Edgar Hoover, noted, " Wesley Liebeler, the Warren Commission assistant counsel who had taken Mrs.
Odio's deposition, disagreed, however, that there was firm evidence of Oswald's bus trip to Mexico City. Odio may well be right. The Commission will look bad if it turns out that she is. Odio's allegation either be proved or disproved. Odio was mistaken, were not sent to Rankin until November 9, at which time the final report already had been completed.
Lawrence Howard and William Seymour, were interviewed. Odio's apartment in September Burton Einspruch, Page her psychiatrist. Odio had contacted Dr. Einspruch for consultation about problems that could not be construed to affect her perception or credibility. Einspruch in Dallas and Silvia Odio in Miami, during which she related to him the visit of the three men.
Odio and Dr. Einspruch concurred that she had told him of the nighttime meeting shortly after its occurrence, but prior to the president's assassination. Odio said, had visited her with Oswald. Odio, but she was unable to identify them as the men she had seen. From the evidence provided in the sworn testimony of the witnesses, it appeared that three men did visit her apartment in Dallas prior to the Kennedy assassination and identified themselves as members of an anti-Castro organization.
Based on a judgment of the credibility of Silvia and Annie Odio, one of these men at least looked like Lee Harvey Oswald and was introduced to Mrs. Odio as Leon Oswald. The committee did not agree with the Warren Commission's conclusion that Oswald could not have been in Dallas at the requisite time. Nevertheless, the committee itself could reach no definite conclusion on the specific date of the visit. It could have been as early as September 24, the morning of which Oswald was seen in New Orleans, but it was more likely on the 25th, 26th or 27th of September.
If it was on these dates, then Oswald had to have had access to private transportation to have traveled through Dallas and still reached Mexico City when he did, judging from other evidence developed by both the Warren Commission and the committee.
In reviewing Oswald's life, the committee found his actions and values to have been those of a self-proclaimed Marxist who would be bound to favor the Castro regime in Cuba, or at least not advocate its overthrow. For this reason, it did not seem likely to the committee that Oswald would have allied Page himself with an anti-Castro group or individual activist for the sole purpose of furthering the anti-Castro cause.
The committee recognized the possibility that Oswald might have established contacts with such groups or persons to implicate the anti-Castro movement in the assassination. Such an implication might have protected the Castro regime and other left-wing suspects, while resulting in an intensive investigation and possible neutralization of the opponents of Castro. It is also possible, despite his alleged remark about killing Kennedy, that Oswald had not yet contemplated the President's assassination at the time of the Odio incident, or if he did, that his assassination plan had no relation to his anti-Castro contacts, and that he was associating with anti-Castro activists for some other unrelated reason.
A variety of speculations are possible, but the committee was forced to acknowledge frankly that, despite its efforts, it was unable to reach firm conclusions as to the meaning or significance of the Odio incident to the President's assassination. Top of Page 1 Oswald in New Orleans. His actions were blatantly pro-Castro, as he carried a one-man Fair Play for Cuba Committee crusade into the streets of a city whose Cuban population was predominantly anti-Castro.
Yet Oswald's known and alleged associations even at this time included Cubans who were of an anti-Castro persuasion and their anti-Communist American supporters. New Orleans was Oswald's home town; he was born there on October 18, In May, Oswald wrote to Vincent T. Oswald, Magazine Street," others with the alias, "A. Hidell, P. The Warren Commission failed to discover any record of Oswald's having rented an office at Camp and concluded he had fabricated the story.
Oswald lost his job at the Reily Coffee Co. Oswald gave Quiroga an application for membership in the FPCC chapter, but Quiroga noted he did not seem intent on actually enlisting members. The reports of Oswald in Clinton were not, as far as the committee could determine, available to the Warren Commission, although one witness said he notified the FBI when he recognized Oswald from news photographs right after the assassination.
Ferrie, a staunch anti-Castro partisan, died within days of having been named by Garrison; the other, Clay L. Shaw, was acquitted in The committee found that the Clinton witnesses were credible and significant. They each were interviewed or deposed, or appeared before the committee in executive session. While there were points that could be raised to call into question their credibility, it was the judgment of the committee that they were telling the truth as they knew it.
There were six Clinton witnesses, among them a State representative, a deputy sheriff and a registrar of voters. Clinton, La. In the late summer of it was targeted by the Congress of Racial Equality for a voting rights campaign. He said he was not contacted again. The FBI had not record of Morgan's call. For example, he referred to himself as "Oswald," and he produced his Marine Corps discharge papers as identification.
Top of Page 3 David Ferrie. On November 23, the day after the assassination, Jack S. Martin, a part-time private detective and police informant, told the office of the New Orleans District Attorney that a former Eastern Airlines pilot named David Ferrie might have aided Oswald in the assassination. He had been fired by Eastern Airlines, and in litigation over the dismissal, which continued through August , he was counseled by a New Orleans attorney named G.
Wray Gill. An unconfirmed U. Marcello denied to the committee in executive session that Ferrie flew him out of Latin America, saying that he flew commercial airlines. Records do not exist that can confirm or refute this contention.
Wray Gill that Martin had implicated him in the, assassination. Wray Gill as his counsel, Marcello was successfully resisting any attempt by the Government to have him legally deported or convicted of a crime. For instance, for Sweden there are portals like Casino. Then in the neighboring UK, both the offline as well as online casinos, plus the sports betting industry is required to provide thorough support to the gamblers. Customers can quickly check their total spending as well as detailed records at every online casino in UK.
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